V. Masnyi, PhD student
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2018.138.10
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINAL AND CONCEPTUAL BASES OF US MILITARY COOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES IN THE LATE 1950’s – SECOND HALF OF THE 1960’s
The article deals with the problems of the development of the doctrinal and conceptual bases of military cooperation between the United States of America and European allies during the late 1950’s – second half of the 1960’s. Particular attention is paid to the reasons and peculiarities of replacing the strategic concept of "massive retaliation" with the strategy of "flexible response" as a basic principle of the US and its military-political partners' implementation of the" containment "doctrine in Europe in the early 1960's. The technological and military changes in the balance of the global confrontation of the Western powers with the USSR and its satellites on the European continent are analyzed, consequences of this change for international relations at the global and European levels are enlighten. The strategic and conceptual reasons for increasing the controversy of the political course of Gaullist France with the strategic plans of the NATO bloc, as well as the role and place of the plan for the creation of "Multilateral Nuclear Forces" in forming of these contradictions, are discussed. The strategic and doctrinal-conceptual implications of France's withdrawal from NATO military structures in 1966 for the United States military-political partnership with the European powers are described.
Key words: USA, Europe, NATO, military, cooperation, doctrine.
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